Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules. by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0101-3
Rev. Econ. Design 8, 249–268 (2003)
c   Springer-Verlag 2003
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible
objects and uniform probabilistic rules
Lars Ehlers1, Bettina Klaus2
1 D´ epartment de Sciences ´ Economiques and CIREQ, Universit´ e de Montr´ eal, Montr´ eal,
Qu´ ebec H3C 3J7, Canada (e-mail: lars.ehlers@umontreal.ca.)
2 Departament d’Economia i d’Hist` oria Econ` omica, UniversitatAut` onoma de Barcelona,
08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain (e-mail: bettina.klaus@uab.es)
Received: 1 January 2002 /Accepted: 5 February 2003
Abstract. Weconsideraprobabilisticapproachtotheproblemofassigningk indi-
visibleidenticalobjectstoasetofagentswithsingle-peakedpreferences.Usingthe
ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic
rules by Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in
this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are
strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, then we reduce
the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount
k of an inﬁnitely divisible commodity.
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1 Introduction
We consider economic environments where indivisible identical objects have to be
assignedtoasetofindividualswithsingle-peakedpreferences.Asanexample,take
theassignmentofthenumberofcoursesaprofessorinaneconomicsdepartmenthas
to teach. Each professor has a number of courses he ﬁnds optimal (probably some-
where between 0 and 4) and preferences are decreasing when moving away from
thatoptimalamountineitherdirection.Ifweareinterestedin“fairallocations”,for
instance allocations that respect equal treatment of equals (if two individuals have
the same preference relation, then they should be indifferent between each other’s
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allotments), then the indivisibility assumption may induce an impossibility. For
simplicity, assume that we have to assign a course and none of the professors in the
department wants to teach it. Obviously there is no deterministic way to do so that
respects equal treatment of equals. However, allowing the rule to be probabilistic
solves our problem at least in an ex-ante sense: if each professor has to teach the
course with equal probability, then equal treatment of equals is satisﬁed (ex-ante).
The probabilistic allocation or rationing of indivisible objects has received re-
cent attention. Two main models should be distinguished. In the ﬁrst one there are
n objects and n agents and each agent receives exactly one object.Any two objects
are distinct and each agent has a strict preference relation over the set of objects.
For example, the agents are workers and each object is a full-time job at a differ-
ent company. The random assignment of the objects to the agents is the subject
of papers byAbdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (1998, 2003), Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001), and Cr` es and Moulin (2001).
In the second model there are k identical indivisible objects and n agents. Each
agent receives a certain number of objects and each object is assigned to some
agent (free disposal is not allowed). For instance, the objects are identical (non
full-time) jobs that have to be allocated among workers. This model is studied
by Moulin (2002), Moulin and Stong (2002), Kureishi (2000), and Sasaki (1997).
In the ﬁrst two papers each agent demands a certain number of objects and the
total demand is greater than the number of objects available. In the last two papers
each agent has a single-peaked preference relation over the number of objects
he may receive. That is, there is a most preferred number of objects, called the
agent’s peak, and preferences are strictly decreasing in either direction away from
the peak. A probabilistic rule chooses for each proﬁle of preferences a probability
distribution over the set of allocations.The interpretation is that the ﬁnal allocation
that we implement is drawn according to this distribution.An agent compares two
distributionsoverthesetofallocationsbyevaluatingthemarginaldistributionsthat
are induced over his allotments.
WeconsiderthesamemodelasKureishi(2000)andSasaki(1997),butwedonot
only consider preferences that can be represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions. First, we use the ordinal extension of preferences over allotments
to probability distributions over allotments.An agent prefers a distribution over his
allotments to another if the ﬁrst distribution places on each weak upper contour
set at least the same probability that is placed on it by the second distribution.
The ordinal extension of preferences is incomplete over the set of distributions.
However, it is equivalent to the following. If an agent prefers one distribution to
another, then for each utility representation of his preference relation the expected
utility with respect to the distribution is greater than or equal to the expected utility
of the second one.1
Using this extension we formulate the requirements of Pareto efﬁciency,
strategy-proofness (no agent can gain by misrepresenting his preference relation),
and no-envy (each agent prefers his marginal distribution to each other agent’s
1 A considerable number of papers considers the ordinal extension of preferences, e.g., Abdulka-
diro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), Ehlers (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2001),
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marginal distribution). Contrary to the model with distinct objects (Bogomolnaia
and Moulin 2001) it turns out that in our model Pareto efﬁciency is equivalent to
ex-post efﬁciency. Using the uniform rule (Benassy 1982), where k units of an in-
ﬁnitely divisible commodity are rationed as equally as possible, we deﬁne uniform
probabilisticrules(Sasaki1997)intermsoftheir“uniformmarginaldistributions”.
We call a probabilistic rule a uniform probabilistic rule if for each proﬁle the
marginals of the chosen distribution are equal to the uniform marginal distributions
at this proﬁle. Our main result is that the class of uniform probabilistic rules is
characterized by Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. This result is
the probabilistic analogue to one of Sprumont’s (1991) result. He shows that when
rationingkunitsofaninﬁnitelydivisiblecommodityamongasetofindividualswith
single-peakedpreferences,theuniformruleistheonlydeterministicrulesatisfying
the above combination of properties. Sprumont’s characterization remains valid if
we replace no-envy by anonymity (Sprumont 1991) or equal treatment of equals
(Ching 1994). However, in our probabilistic setting this conclusion is not true.
For example, any random dictatorship rule satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and anonymity. It is an open question what the class of probabilistic
rules satisfying these properties looks like.
In two related papers (Sasaki 1997, Kureishi 2000) agents are assumed to be
strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, i.e., each agent
evaluates distributions on the basis of the expected utility relative to his utility
function. They show that for a given proﬁle of utility functions, if a distribution is
Pareto efﬁcient, then each agent’s marginal distribution places probability 1 on two
allotments that differ only by one unit. Using this observation we show that then,
the problem can be reduced to the problem of allocating k units of an inﬁnitely
divisible commodity among n agents with single-peaked preferences over [0,k].
Then we apply the characterization of the (deterministic) uniform rule by Ching
(1994) and show that in the probabilistic model with strictly risk averse agents, the
class of uniform probabilistic rules is characterized by Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and equal treatment of equals. Therefore, the results of Sasaki (1997)
and Kureishi (2000) can be interpreted as corollaries of Ching (1994).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the model
and basic properties. In Sect. 3 we deﬁne the class of uniform probabilistic rules
and present our main result. In Sect. 4 we prove the characterization. Finally, in
Sect. 5 we focus on strictly risk averse agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions.
2 The model and basic properties
Weconsidertheproblemofassigningkindivisibleidenticalobjectstoasetofagents
N = {1,...,n}. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a “single-peaked” preference
relation Ri deﬁned over the number of objects he receives; i.e., Ri is deﬁned over
K ≡{ 0,1,...,k} and there exists a number of objects p(Ri) ∈ K, called the
peak of Ri, with the following property: for all xi,y i ∈ K,i fxi <y i ≤ p(Ri) or
xi >y i ≥ p(Ri), then yi Pi xi. As usual, xi Ri yi means “xi is weakly preferred
to yi”, and xi Pi yi means “xi is strictly preferred to yi”. By R we denote the class252 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
of all single-peaked preference relations over K.B yRN we denote the set of all
(preference) proﬁles R =( Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈R .
We call x ∈ KN a feasible allocation if

i∈N xi = k. Let X denote the set of
allfeasibleallocations.2Adeterministic(allocation)ruleΦisafunctionthatselects
for every R ∈R N a feasible allocation Φ(R) ∈ X. Each agent i ∈ N only cares
about his own allotment Φi(R) ∈ K.
We extend the original analysis of deterministic rules by considering “proba-
bilistic” rules.A probabilistic (allocation) rule ϕ is a function that selects for every
R ∈R N a (probability) distribution over the set of feasible allocations X, denoted
by ϕ(R).G i v e nX  ⊆ X, we denote by ϕ(R)(X ) the probability that the distri-
bution ϕ(R) places on the set X . Since the set of feasible allocations X is ﬁnite,
a distribution over X can be interpreted as a lottery, or a simple gamble, on X.F o r
X = {x1,...,x |X|} we denote such a distribution over the set of feasible alloca-
tionsX by[p1◦x1,...,p |X|◦x|X|]whereforalll ∈{ 1,...,|X|},pl ∈ [0,1]and
|X|
l=1 pl =1 . For notational convenience, when formalizing distributions, we only
denote feasible allocations xl that occur with strictly positive probability pl > 0,
e.g., instead of [1
2 ◦ x1, 1
2 ◦ x2,0 ◦ x3,...,0 ◦ x|X|] we write [1
2 ◦ x1, 1
2 ◦ x2].
For each agent i ∈ N, let ϕi(R) denote the marginal distribution induced by
ϕ(R) over his allotments in K. Each agent i ∈ N only cares about his marginal
distribution ϕi(R) on K.A deterministic rule is a probabilistic rule that selects for
every R ∈R N a distribution placing probability 1 on a single allocation in X.
The following example demonstrates that two distributions having the same
marginal distributions need not be equal.




and Q  =[ 1
3 ◦ (3,0,6), 1
3 ◦ (6,3,0), 1
3 ◦ (0,6,3)]. Then for all i ∈ N, Qi = Q 
i,
but Q  = Q .    
We extend preferences on agents’allotments in K to marginal distributions on
K. Our extension is based on the concept of weak upper contour sets.
Given xi ∈ K and Ri ∈R , the weak upper contour set of xi at Ri is deﬁned
as B(xi,R i) ≡{ yi ∈ K | yi Ri xi}. Given a preference relation Ri ∈Rand two
marginal distributions Qi,Q  
i on K, agent i weakly prefers Qi to Q 
i,i fQi assigns
to each weak upper contour set at least the probability that is assigned to this set
by Q 
i. For notational convenience we use the same symbols Ri and Pi to denote
preferences over both marginal distributions and allotments.
Ordinal extension of preferences. For all Ri ∈Rand all marginal distributions
Qi,Q  
i on K, Qi Ri Q 
i if and only if
for all xi ∈ K, Qi(B(xi,R i)) ≥ Q 
i(B(xi,R i)). (1)
Furthermore, Qi Pi Q 
i if and only if Qi Ri Q 
i and
for some yi ∈ K, Qi(B(yi,R i)) >Q  
i(B(yi,R i)). (2)
2 The number of feasible allocations equals the number of k-combinations with repetition of an




.Probabilistic assignments and uniform probabilistic rules 253
Inequality (1) is a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance condition; in particular it
requires that the marginal distributions Qi and Q 
i are comparable in that respect.
Therefore, our extension is not complete on the set of all marginal distributions on
K.
Our extension of preferences is equivalent to the following. Assume that each
agent’s preference relation over lotteries can be represented by a utility function in
the sense that it can be used to compare two marginal distributions via the expected
utilities relative to this representation. Then (1) is equivalent to the fact that the
expected utility relative to any utility function representing Ri is at Q greater
or equal than at Q . Thus, regardless which utility function represents an agent’s
preference relation, he weakly prefers Q to Q . For a further discussion of utility
representation of preferences we refer to Sect. 5.
We are interested in Pareto efﬁciency. Following the deﬁnition of Pareto ef-
ﬁciency for deterministic rules, a probabilistic rule is Pareto efﬁcient if it only
assigns “Pareto efﬁcient distributions on X”; i.e., a distribution assigned by the
probabilistic rule cannot be changed in such a way that no agent is worse off and
some agent is better off.
LetQ,Q  bedistributionsonX.Ifforalli ∈ N,QiRiQ 
i andforsomej ∈ N,
Qj Pj Q 
j, then we call Q a Pareto improvement over Q .
Paretoefﬁciency. ForallR ∈R N,thereexistsnoParetoimprovementoverϕ(R).
Remark 1 (Same-sidedness). A deterministic rule Φ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency if
and only if Φ satisﬁes same-sidedness; i.e., for all R ∈ RN,
(i) if

i∈N p(Ri) ≥ k, then for all i ∈ N, Φi(R) ≤ p(Ri) and
(ii) if

i∈N p(Ri) ≤ k, then for all i ∈ N, Φi(R) ≥ p(Ri).    
A similar result holds for probabilistic rules: ex-post efﬁciency is equivalent
to same-sidedness. Given xi,y i ∈ K such that xi ≤ yi, let [xi,y i] ≡{ xi,x i +
1,...,y i}.
Lemma 1 (Pareto efﬁciency). A probabilistic rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency if
and only if it satisﬁes same-sidedness; i.e., for all R ∈R N,
(i) if

i∈N p(Ri) ≥ k, then for all i ∈ N, ϕi(R)([0,p(Ri) ] )=1and
(ii) if

i∈N p(Ri) ≤ k, then for all i ∈ N, ϕi(R)([p(Ri),k] )=1 .
Proof. It is straightforward to show that if ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, then (i) and
(ii)hold.Toshowtheconverse,supposeϕsatisﬁessame-sidedness.Supposethatϕ
violatesParetoefﬁciencyforsomeR ∈R N.Thus,thereexistsadistributionQover
X such that for all i ∈ N, QiRiϕi(R) and for some j ∈ N, Qj Pj ϕj(R).Without
loss of generality, let k ≤

i∈N p(Ri) and for all i ∈ N, Qi(R)([0,p(Ri) ] )=1 .
Given i ∈ N, the function fi : X → K denotes the projection of X onto i’s
coordinate, i.e., for all x ∈ X, fi(x)=xi. Since Q and ϕ(R) satisfy same-
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X fidϕ(R), and for some j ∈ N,
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Now, the previous two facts contradict (3).    
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 imply that an allocation chosen by the
probabilisticruleϕsatisﬁessame-sidednessandthereforeParetoefﬁciency.Hence,
Lemma 1 states that Pareto efﬁciency and ex-post Pareto efﬁciency are equivalent
in our model. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that this equivalence is not
valid when assigning heterogenous indivisible objects to individuals.
Nextweintroducestrategy-proofnessforprobabilisticrules.Strategy-proofness
requiresthatnoagentcaneverbeneﬁtfrommisrepresentinghispreferencerelation.3
Given R ∈R N and M ⊆ N, the restriction (Ri)i∈M ∈R M of R to M is
denoted by RM. We also use the notation R−i = RN\{i}. For example, ( ¯ Ri,R −i)
denotes the proﬁle obtained from R by replacing Ri by ¯ Ri.
Strategy-proofness. For all R ∈R N, all i ∈ N, and all ¯ Ri ∈R , ϕi(R) Ri




can improve his expected utility for any representation of his ordinal preferences.
This strategy-proofness condition is especially appealing when the planner only
knowstheordinalpreferencesoftheagentsbutnottheirvonNeumann-Morgenstern
expected utility representations.
Anonymity requires that the names of the agents do not matter. More precisely,
an anonymous probabilistic rule is symmetric in its arguments.
Let ΠN be the class of all permutations on N. Then for all R ∈R N and all
π ∈ ΠN, let Rπ ≡ (Rπ(i))i∈N.
Anonymity. For all R ∈R N, all π ∈ ΠN, and all i ∈ N, ϕπ(i)(R)=ϕi(Rπ).
No-envy states that no agent strictly prefers the marginal distribution of another
agent to his own.
No-envy. For all R ∈R N and all i,j ∈ N, ϕi(R) Ri ϕj(R).
No-envy also requires that the agents’ marginal distributions that are assigned
by the probabilistic rule are comparable.
3 In game theoretical terms, a rule satisﬁes strategy-proofness if in its associated direct revelation
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The following is a weakening of no-envy and anonymity. Equal treatment of
equals requires that if two agents have the same preference relations, then each of
themisindifferentbetweenhismarginaldistributionandtheotheragent’smarginal
distribution.
Equal treatment of equals. For all R ∈R N and all i,j ∈ N,i fRi = Rj, then
ϕi(R) Ii ϕj(R).
3 The uniform probabilistic correspondence
Inidentifyingprobabilisticrulesthatsatisfyacertaincombinationofproperties,we
arenotabletodeterminetheexactdistributionforeachproﬁle.Allrequirementsare
formulated with respect to marginal distributions and as demonstrated in Example
1 those do not uniquely determine the original distribution. We are only able to
show that a probabilistic rule satisﬁes a certain list of requirements if and only
if for each proﬁle the marginal distributions are of a certain form. Therefore, we
introduce correspondences that assign to each proﬁle a set of distributions.
The following “uniform correspondence” assigns to each proﬁle exactly the
distributions that induce “uniform marginal distributions” on each agent’s allot-
ments: for each proﬁle of peaks (p(Ri))i∈N calculate the so-called uniform allo-
cation for R. Denote this allocation by ˜ U(R). Without loss of generality, suppose
that R is in excess demand, i.e.,

i∈N p(Ri) >k(the deﬁnition for the excess
supply case is similar). Thus, for some λ ∈ [0,k], we have that for all i ∈ N,
˜ Ui(R) = min(p(Ri),λ).Foreachagentwechoosethefollowinguniformmarginal
distribution fi(R) over his allotments. If ˜ Ui(R)=p(Ri), then fi(R) places prob-
ability 1 on p(Ri). Otherwise, calculate xλ ∈{ 0,1,...,k} such that λ belongs to
the interval with endpoints xλ and xλ +1 . Then calculate weights α and (1 − α)
on the endpoints such that λ equals the convex combination of the two endpoints
according to the weights, i.e., λ = αxλ +(1−α)(xλ +1)where α ∈ [0,1]. Then,
the uniform marginal distribution fi(R) places probability α on xλ and probability
1 − α on xλ +1 .
Uniform probabilistic correspondence, U. Let R ∈R N and Q be a distribution
over X. Then Q ∈U(R) if and only if the following holds.
(i) Excess demand:

i∈N p(Ri) >k .
Let ˜ Ui(R) = min(p(Ri),λ) where λ ∈ R+ solves

i∈N ˜ Ui(R)=k.
Determine xλ ∈ K such that λ ∈ [xλ,x λ +1 [ . Then for all i ∈ N,
(a) if p(Ri) ≤ xλ, then Qi(p(Ri) )=1and
(b) if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then Qi(xλ +1 )=λ − xλ and Qi(xλ)=1− (λ − xλ).
(ii) Balanced demand:

i∈N p(Ri)=k. Then for all i ∈ N, Qi(p(Ri) )=1 .
(iii) Excess supply:

i∈N p(Ri) <k .
Let ˜ Ui(R) = max(p(Ri),λ) where λ ∈ R+ solves

i∈N ˜ Ui(R)=k.
Determine xλ ∈ K such that λ ∈]xλ,x λ +1 ] . Then for all i ∈ N,
(a) if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then Qi(p(Ri) )=1and
(b) if p(Ri) ≤ xλ, then Qi(xλ +1 )=λ − xλ and Qi(xλ)=1− (λ − xλ).256 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
We say that a probabilistic rule ϕ is a uniform probabilistic rule if for all R ∈R N,
ϕ(R) ∈U(R).Thefollowingexampleofaprobabilisticruleprovesthattheuniform
correspondence is non-empty.
Example 2. We deﬁne the uniform probabilistic rule U as follows (Sasaki 1997; in
deﬁning the uniform probabilistic rule U Moulin (2002) uses the same trick as we
do4 in deﬁning the correspondence U). Let R ∈R N.
(i) Excess demand:

i∈N p(Ri) >k .
Without loss of generality, let ¯ N = {i ∈ N | p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1} = {1,...,¯ n}
and ˜ N = {i ∈ N | p(Ri) ≤ xλ} = {¯ n +1 ,...,n}. Then we obtain U(R)
as follows: in each allocation that occurs at U(R) with positive probability,
each agent in ˜ N receives his peak amount and each agent in ¯ N receives either
xλ or xλ +1 . Note that for each i ∈ ¯ N, (xλ +1 )Pi xλ and that exactly
¯ n(λ − xλ) agents in ¯ N can receive xλ +1 . We obtain U(R) by placing
equal probability on all allocations where all agents in ˜ N receive their peak
amounts, ¯ n(λ − xλ) agents in ¯ N receive xλ +1 , and the remaining agents






(a) if p(Ri) ≤ xλ, then Ui(R)(p(Ri) )=1 and







i∈N p(Ri) <k .
Without loss of generality, let ¯ N = {i ∈ N | p(Ri) ≤ xλ} = {1,...,¯ n} and
˜ N = {i ∈ N | p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1} = {¯ n+1,...,n}. Then we obtain U(R) as
follows: in each allocation that occurs at U(R) with positive probability, each
agent in ˜ N receives his peak amount and each agent in ¯ N receives either xλ
or xλ +1. Note that for i ∈ ¯ N, xλ Pi (xλ +1)and that exactly ¯ n− ¯ n(λ−xλ)
agents in ¯ N can receive xλ. In other words, ¯ n(λ − xλ) agents in ¯ N receive
xλ +1.We obtain U(R) by placing equal probability on all allocations where
all agents in ˜ N receive their peak amounts, ¯ n(λ − xλ) agents in ¯ N receive
xλ +1 , and the remaining agents in ¯ N receive xλ. Hence, U(R) is obtained





(a) if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then Ui(R)(p(Ri) )=1and
(b) if p(Ri) ≤ xλ, then Ui(R)(xλ +1 )=λ − xλ and Ui(R)(xλ)=1− (λ −
xλ).    
Example 3. Let N = {1,2,3,4} and k =2 . Let R ∈ RN be such that for all




















4 Moulin (2002) and we found this trick independently.Probabilistic assignments and uniform probabilistic rules 257
Let Q =[ 1
2 ◦(1,1,0,0), 1
2 ◦(0,0,1,1)] and Q  =[ 1
2 ◦(1,0,0,1), 1
2 ◦(0,1,1,0)].
Then for all i ∈ N, Qi = Ui(R)=Q 
i (Q,Q ,U(R) ∈U(R)), but U(R)  = Q  =
Q   = U(R).    
Our main result is that, similarly as in the deterministic setting (Sprumont,
1991; Ching, 1992; Ehlers, 2000), Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and no-
envy determine “uniform allocations”.
Theorem 1. Uniform probabilistic rules are the only probabilistic rules satisfying
Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy.
Remark 2. Theorem 1 is a tight characterization since we already know from the
deterministicframeworkthatallpropertiesarelogicallyindependent(seeSprumont
1991 and Ching 1992). However, in contrast to the deterministic framework, we
cannot replace no-envy with anonymity or weaken it to equal treatment of equals
(see Example 4).    
Example 4. Let N = {1,2} and R ∈ RN.







◦ (k − p(R2),p(R2))].
– If p(R1)+p(R2)=k, then
ψ(R)=[ 1◦ (p(R1),p(R2))].
The probabilistic rule ψ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
anonymity. However, as we demonstrate next, ψ violates no-envy.













Thus, by ψ1(R)(2) = 1
2 = ψ2(R)(2) and ψ1(R)(4) = 1
2 = ψ2(R)(0), ψ1(R) P2
ψ2(R), which contradicts no-envy.    
Example 4 can be easily extended to an arbitrary number of agents. More
precisely, the rule ψ is the random dictatorship rule for two agents. For an arbitrary
number of agents, the random dictatorship rule is Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof,
and anonymous. Note that all convex combinations of uniform probabilistic rules
and the random dictatorship rule satisfy Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
anonymity. It is an open question whether there are other probabilistic rules that
satisfy this list of properties.258 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
4 Proof of the characterization
It is straightforward to check that each uniform probabilistic rule satisﬁes Pareto
efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. Conversely, let ϕ be a probabilistic
rulesatisfyingParetoefﬁciency,strategy-proofness,and no-envy.Wehavetoshow
that for all R ∈R N, ϕ(R) ∈U(R).
Pareto efﬁciency and Lemma 1 imply that if demand is balanced, then (ii) in
the deﬁnition of U holds. In the remainder of this section we prove that if R is in
excess demand, then (i) in the deﬁnition of U holds. The proof of (iii), i.e., excess
supply, is similar.
Recall that for all xi,y i ∈ K such that xi ≤ yi,w eh a v e[xi,y i] ≡{ xi,x i +
1,...,y i}.
Lemma 2. Let R ∈R N be such that

i∈N p(Ri) >k . Then for all i ∈ N,
ϕi(R)([min(p(Ri),x λ),p(Ri) ] )=1 .
Proof. Let i ∈ N. We consider two cases.
Case 1. p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 . We have to show that ϕi(R)([xλ,p(Ri) ] )=1 .Assume,
by contradiction, that
ϕi(R)([xλ,p(Ri)]) < 1. (4)
Let R 
i ∈Rbe such that p(R 
i)=p(Ri) and for all xi ∈ [p(Ri),k], B(xi,R  
i)=
[p(Ri),x i]. Deﬁne R  ≡ (R 





PE = ϕi(R)(B(xλ,R i))
SP
≥ ϕi(R )(B(xλ,R i))
PE = ϕi(R )([xλ,p(Ri)]).
Thus,
ϕi(R )([xλ,p(Ri)]) < 1. (5)
Hence, by Pareto efﬁciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the construction of R 
i, for all




PE = ϕi(R )([xλ,k]) = ϕi(R )(B(xλ,R  
i))
NE
≥ ϕj(R )(B(xλ,R  
i)) = ϕj(R )([xλ,k]).
Thus, for all j ∈ N,
ϕj(R )([xλ,k]) < 1. (6)




j∈N p(Rj) >k , Sλ  = ∅.
For all T ⊆ Sλ, deﬁne RT =( ( RT
j )j∈T,R  
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– p(RT
j )=xλ and
– for all xj ∈ [xλ,k], B(xj,R T
j )=[ xλ,x j].




l ) >k , then by (6) and strategy-proofness (SP),
1
(6)
>ϕ j(R )([xλ,k]) ≥ ϕj(R )(B(xλ,R  
j))
SP




j )) = ϕj(R{j})([xλ,k]).
(7)
By (7) and no-envy (NE), for all l  = j,
1
(7)






j )) = ϕl(R{j})([xλ,k]).
Thus, for all l ∈ N, ϕl(R{j})([xλ,k]) < 1. Hence, by repeated application of the
above arguments, if for T ⊆ Sλ,

l∈N p(RT
l ) >k , then for all l ∈ N,
ϕl(RT)([xλ,k]) < 1. (8)









By the deﬁnition of λ, T0  = ∅. Let ¯ Rj ∈Rbe such that p( ¯ Rj)=k − 
l =j p(R
T0
l ). Deﬁne ¯ R ≡ ( ¯ Rj,R
T0
−j). Note that






By Pareto efﬁciency, ϕj( ¯ R)(p( ¯ Rj) )=1 . Since p( ¯ Rj) ∈ B(xλ,R
T0
j ), it follows
thatϕj( ¯ R)(B(xλ,R
T0








≥ ϕj( ¯ R)(B(xλ,R
T0
j ) )=1 .
Therefore, (4) was wrong and the statement for Case 1 is proven.
Case 2. p(Ri) ≤ xλ. We have to show that ϕi(R)(p(Ri) )=1 . Assume, by
contradiction, that
ϕi(R)(p(Ri)) < 1. (9)
Let R 
i ∈R be such that p(R 
i)=p(Ri) and for all xi ∈ [p(Ri),k],
B(xi,R  
i)=[ p(Ri),x i]. Deﬁne R  ≡ (R 
i,R −i). By strategy-proofness and (9),260 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
ϕi(R )(p(Ri)) < 1. By Pareto efﬁciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the construction
of R 
i, for all j ∈ N,
1 >ϕ i(R )(p(Ri))
PE = ϕi(R )([p(Ri),k]) = ϕi(R )(B(k,R 
i))
NE
≥ ϕj(R )(B(k,R 
i)) = ϕj(R )([p(Ri),k]).
Particularly, because p(Ri) ≤ xλ, for all j ∈ N,
ϕj(R )([xλ,k]) < 1. (10)
However, for some j ∈ N, p(R 
j) ≥ xλ +1 . Hence, in contradiction to (10), by
Case 1 and Pareto efﬁciency (PE), 1=ϕj(R )([xλ,p(R 
j)])
PE = ϕj(R )([xλ,k]).
   
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we prove that for all R ∈R N,i f 
i∈N p(Ri) >k , then for all i ∈ N, ϕi(R)=Ui(R); i.e.,
(a) if p(Ri) ≤ xλ, then ϕi(R)(p(Ri) )=1=Ui(R)(p(Ri)) and
(b) if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then ϕi(R)(xλ +1 )=λ − xλ = Ui(R)(xλ +1 )and
ϕi(R)(xλ)=1− (λ − xλ)=Ui(R)(xλ).
Let R ∈R N be such that

i∈N p(Ri) >k . By Lemma 2, for all i ∈ N,
ϕi(R)([min(p(Ri),x λ),p(Ri) ] )=1 . Thus, for all i ∈ N,i fp(Ri) ≤ xλ, then
ϕi(R)(p(Ri) )=1 . (11)
Hence, (11) implies (a); i.e., if p(Ri) ≤ xλ, then ϕi(R)=Ui(R).
Next, we prove (b); i.e., if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1, then ϕi(R)=Ui(R). We consider
two cases.
Case 1. For some j ∈ N, Rj ∈Ris such that p(Rj)=xλ +1 , and for all
xj ∈ [p(Rj),k], B(xj,R j)=[ p(Rj),x j].
By Pareto efﬁciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the structure of Rj, for all i ∈ N





PE = ϕi(R)([xλ +1 ,p(Ri)]).
Similarly, for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 ,
ϕi(R)([xλ +1 ,p(Ri)])
PE = ϕi(R)(B(xλ +1 ,R i))
NE
≥ ϕj(R)(B(xλ +1 ,R i))
PE = ϕj(R)(p(Rj)).
Hence, for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 ,
ϕi(R)([xλ +1 ,p(Ri)]) = ϕj(R)(p(Rj)). (12)Probabilistic assignments and uniform probabilistic rules 261
Thus, by Lemma 2, for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 ,
ϕi(R)(xλ)=ϕj(R)(xλ)=1− ϕj(R)(p(Rj)). (13)
We consider two subcases.
Case 1.1. For all i ∈ N, p(Ri) ≤ xλ +1 .
Thus, by Pareto efﬁciency, for all i ∈ N, ϕi(R)([xλ +2 ,k] )=0 . Then by
Lemma 2 and (13), for all i,l ∈ N such that p(Ri)=p(Rl)=xλ +1 ,
































Furthermore, note that for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri)=xλ +1 ,
ϕi(R)(xλ)+ϕi(R)(xλ +1 )=1 . (17)













This and (14) imply that for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri)=xλ+1, ϕi(R)(xλ+1)=
λ−xλ.Thus, for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri)=xλ +1, ϕi(R)(xλ)=1−(λ−xλ).
This proves (b); i.e., if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then ϕi(R)=Ui(R). This completes the
proof for Case 1.1.
Case 1.2. For some l ∈ N, p(Rl) ≥ xλ +2 .
If for all l ∈ N such that p(Rl) ≥ xλ +2 , ϕl(R)([xλ +2 ,k] )=0 , then
similarly as in Case 1.1 it follows that p(Rl) ≥ xλ +1implies ϕl(R)=Ul(R).
Assume, by contradiction, that for some l ∈ N such that p(Rl) ≥ xλ +2 ,
ϕl(R)([xλ +2 ,k]) > 0. (18)
Let R 
l ∈Rbe such that R 
l = Rj and R  ≡ (R 
l,R −l). By Pareto efﬁciency (PE)
and strategy-proofness (SP),
ϕl(R )(xλ +1 )




l)) = ϕl(R)([xλ +1 ,k])262 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
and
ϕl(R)([xλ +1 ,k])
PE = ϕl(R)(B(xλ +1 ,R l))
SP
≥ ϕl(R )(B(xλ +1 ,R l))
PE = ϕl(R )(xλ +1 ) .
Hence,
ϕl(R )(xλ +1 )=ϕl(R)([xλ +1 ,k]) and (19)
ϕl(R )(xλ)=ϕl(R)(xλ). (20)
Suppose that for all i ∈ N such that p(R 
i) ≥ xλ +2, ϕi(R )([xλ +2,k] )=0 . Let
N  ≡{ i ∈ N | p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 } = {i ∈ N | p(R 
i) ≥ xλ +1 }.
Consider proﬁle R and recall from Case 1 that for all i ∈ N , ϕi(R)([xλ +
1,p(Ri)]) = ϕj(R)(p(Rj)) and ϕi(R)(xλ)=ϕj(R)(xλ). In particular, for all
i ∈ N ,
ϕi(R)([xλ +1 ,p(Ri)]) = ϕj(R)(p(Rj)) = ϕl(R)([xλ +1 ,p(Rl)]) and (21)
ϕi(R)(xλ)=ϕj(R)(xλ)=ϕl(R)(xλ). (22)
Consider proﬁle R  and recall from Case 1 that for all i ∈ N , ϕi(R )([xλ +
1,p(R 
i)]) = ϕj(R )(p(Rj)) and ϕi(R )(xλ)=ϕj(R )(xλ). In particular, for all
i ∈ N ,
ϕi(R )(xλ +1 )=ϕj(R )(p(R 
j)) = ϕl(R )(xλ +1 )and (23)
ϕi(R )(xλ)=ϕj(R )(xλ)=ϕl(R )(xλ). (24)
Hence, for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(R )(xλ +1 )
(23)
= ϕl(R )(xλ +1 )
(19)
= ϕl(R)([xλ +1 ,k])
(21)
= ϕi(R)([xλ +1 ,p(Ri)]).
(25)









Since for all i ∈ N such that p(R 
i) ≥ xλ +2 , ϕi(R )([xλ +2 ,k] )=0 , (25)
implies that for all i ∈ N ,
k 
xi=xλ+1




(27)Probabilistic assignments and uniform probabilistic rules 263
In particular, by (18) and (19),




Hence, (26), (27), and (28) imply

i∈N 














xi=0 ϕi(R )(xi)xi = k,

i∈N 
































which contradicts (29). Thus, our assumption that for all i ∈ N such that p(R 
i) ≥
xλ +2we have ϕi(R )([xλ +2 ,k] )=0was wrong. Hence, for some h ∈ N,
p(R 
h) ≥ xλ +2and ϕh(R)([xλ +2 ,k]) > 0. Similarly as before, we replace R 
h
by Rj and show that for some m ∈ N, p(R 
m) ≥ xλ +2and ϕm(R 
−h,R j)([xλ +
2,k]) > 0. Since N is ﬁnite and at each step the number of agents having a peak
greater than or equal to xλ +2is smaller, we obtain a contradiction. Therefore, (b)
holds for Case 1; i.e., if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then ϕi(R)=Ui(R).
Case2. Thereexistsnoj ∈ N suchthatp(Rj)=xλ+1orforRj suchthatp(Rj)=
xλ +1there exists some xj ∈ [p(Rj),k] such that B(xj,R j)  =[ p(Rj),x j].
We have to show (b); i.e., if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then ϕi(R)=Ui(R). First we
show that for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 ,
ϕi(R)(xλ)=Ui(R)(xλ). (30)
Assume, by contradiction, that for some j ∈ N such that p(Rj) ≥ xλ +1 ,
ϕj(R)(xλ)  = Uj(R)(xλ).264 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
Consider R 
j ∈Rsuch that p(R 




j),x j]. Deﬁne R  ≡ (R 
j,R −j). By strategy-proofness,
ϕj(R)([xλ +1 ,k]) = ϕj(R)(B(xλ +1 ,R j))
SP
≥ ϕj(R )(B(xλ +1 ,R j)) = ϕj(R )([xλ +1 ,k])
and





= ϕj(R)([xλ +1 ,k]).
Hence, ϕj(R )([xλ +1 ,k]) = ϕj(R)([xλ +1 ,k]). By Lemma 2,
ϕj(R )(xλ)=1− ϕj(R )([xλ +1 ,k] )=1− ϕj(R)([xλ +1 ,k]) = ϕj(R)(xλ)
 = Uj(R)(xλ)=Uj(R )(xλ),
which contradicts Case 1. Thus, (30) is proven. Hence, by Lemma 2, for all i ∈ N
such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 ,
ϕi(R)([xλ +1 ,k]) = 1 − ϕi(R)(xλ)
=1− Ui(R)(xλ)
= Ui(R)(xλ +1 ) .
If for all i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , ϕi(R)([xλ +2 ,k] )=0 , then for all
i ∈ N such that p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , ϕi(R)=Ui(R), which proves (b). Suppose, by
contradiction,thatforsomej ∈ N suchthatp(Rj) ≥ xλ+1,ϕj(R)([xλ+2,k]) >
0. So,




LetN  ≡{ i ∈ N | p(Ri) ≥ xλ+1}.Sinceforalli ∈ N ,Ui(R)([xλ+2,k] )=0 ,




Hence, by (30), (31), and (32),

i∈N 















































which contradicts (33) and ﬁnishes the proof of (b); i.e., if p(Ri) ≥ xλ +1 , then
ϕi(R)=Ui(R).    
5 Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
In this section we assume that agents have single-peaked preferences that satisfy
the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility property; i.e., for any pref-
erence relation Ri
(i) there exists a utility function ui that represents Ri and5






that agent i receives l ∈ K objects,
ui(Qi)=ui([p0
i ◦ 0,p 1
i ◦ 1,...,p k





Furthermore, we assume that all agents are strictly risk averse;i.e., for all l ∈
{1,...,k− 1},
ui(l) − ui(l − 1) >u i(l +1 )− ui(l).
Let V denote the class of all vNM-utility functions that exhibit strict risk aver-
sion. Let VN denote the set of all (vNM-utility) proﬁles u =( ui)i∈N such that for
all i ∈ N, ui ∈V. Note that if a utility function exhibits strict risk aversion, then it
is single-peaked. Given ui ∈V, there exists Ri ∈Rsuch that ui represents Ri.W e
deﬁnethepeakp(ui)ofui byp(ui) ≡ p(Ri).Let ¯ Rdenotethesetofsingle-peaked
preference relations such that there exists some ui ∈Vthat represents Ri. Strict
risk aversion implies that ¯ R   R.
5 A utility function ui represents a preference relation Ri if and only if for all x,y ∈ K
xR i y ⇔ ui(x) ≥ ui(y).266 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
Let D(X) denote the set of all distributions over X. Throughout this section a
probabilistic rule is a function ϕ: VN →D (X). Next, we reformulate our central
properties by replacing preference relations by utility functions.
Let Q, Q  be distributions over X. If for all i ∈ N, ui(Qi) ≥ ui(Q 
i) and for
some j ∈ N, uj(Qj) >u j(Q 
j), then we call Q a Pareto improvement of Q .
Pareto efﬁciency. For all u ∈V N, there exists no Pareto improvement of ϕ(R).
Given u ∈V N and M ⊆ N, the restriction (ui)i∈M ∈V M of u to M is
denoted by uM. Similarly as before, (¯ ui,u −i) denotes the proﬁle obtained from u
by replacing ui by ¯ ui.
Strategy-proofness. For all u ∈V N, all i ∈ N, and all ¯ ui ∈V , ui(ϕi(u)) ≥
ui(ϕi(¯ ui,u −i)).
For all u ∈V N and all π ∈ ΠN, let uπ ≡ (uπ(i))i∈N.
Anonymity. For all u ∈V N, all π ∈ ΠN, and all i ∈ N, ϕπ(i)(u)=ϕi(uπ).
No-envy. For all u ∈V N and all i,j ∈ N, ui(ϕi(R)) ≥ ui(ϕj(R)).
Equal treatment of equals. For all u ∈V N and all i,j ∈ N,i fui = uj, then
ui(ϕi(u)) = ui(ϕj(u)).
Using strictly risk averse vNM-utility functions induces a stronger Pareto ef-
ﬁciency condition than using the ordinal preference extension. Same-sidedness is
still implied, but no longer sufﬁcient. In order to characterize Pareto efﬁciency we
introduce the following notation.
Let Q be a distribution and for all i ∈ N, Qi =[ p0
i ◦ 0,p 1
i ◦ 1,...,p k
i ◦ k]
denotes the induced marginal distribution. For all i ∈ N, let
Gi(Qi)={l ∈ K | pl
i  =0 }.
Hence, Gi(Qi) denotes all amounts that agent i can possibly receive at Q (or
equivalently, Gi(Qi) is the support of Qi).
The following Lemma is due to Sasaki (1997), Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 3 (Sasaki, 1997). If a probabilistic rule ϕ: VN →D (X) satisﬁes Pareto
efﬁciency on VN, then for all u ∈V N and all i ∈ N there exists a number of
objects ai ∈ K such that Gi(ϕi(u)) ⊆{ ai,a i +1 }.
Using Lemma 3, we can derive a characterization of Pareto efﬁciency on VN.
Lemma 4. A probabilistic rule ϕ: VN →D (X) satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency on VN
if and only if
(i) ϕ satisﬁes ex-post Pareto efﬁciency on VN and
(ii) for all u ∈V N and all i ∈ N there exists a number of objects ai ∈ K such
that Gi(ϕi(u)) ⊆{ ai,a i +1 }.Probabilistic assignments and uniform probabilistic rules 267
The only-if part of Lemma 4 follows from Lemma 3. We omit the proof of the
if-part of Lemma 4.6
Lemma 4 implies that any Pareto efﬁcient allocation can be represented as a
vector of nonnegative real numbers. Let Q be a distribution that is Pareto efﬁcient
forsomeu ∈V N.ThenQcanberepresentedasfollows.AccordingtoLemma4,for
alli ∈ N thereexistsanumberofobjectsai ∈ K suchthatGi(Qi) ⊆{ ai,a i+1}.
By µi we denote the probability at Qi for agent i to receive ai. Thus, agent i
receives ai +1at Qi with probability 1−µi. Using these unique probabilities, we
can represent the distribution Qi by a unique number qi ∈ [0,k]. Simply deﬁne
qi ≡ µiai +( 1− µi)(ai +1 )=( ai +1 )− µi.
Note that we have

i∈N qi = k. Thus, each distribution Q is identiﬁed with
a unique allocation (q1,...,q n) ∈ [0,k]N of k units of an inﬁnitely divisible
commodity.Let ˜ D(X)denotethesetofalldistributionsQ ∈D (X)suchthatforall
i ∈ N there exists some ai ∈ K for which Gi(Qi) ⊆{ ai,a i+1}. Hence, a Pareto
efﬁcient probabilistic rule is a function ϕ: VN → ˜ D(X). Let X(N,k) denote the
setofallallocationsthatareobtainedviasomedistributionbelongingto ˜ D(X),i.e.,
X(N,k) ≡{ (q1,...,q n) | Q ∈ ˜ D(X)}. Obviously, X   X(N,k). Therefore, a
Pareto efﬁcient rule ϕ essentially splits the amount k of a perfectly divisible good
among the agents in N. Conversely, each vector (q1,...,q n) ∈X(N,k) uniquely
identiﬁes marginal distributions Qi and a (non-unique) distribution Q ∈ ˜ D(X).
Note that single-peakedness on K implies single-peakedness on [0,k] if agents
consider assignments qi ∈ [0,k] that correspond to marginal distributions Qi.
Therefore, the problem of assigning k identical objects to a set of agents with
single-peaked preferences by using a Pareto efﬁcient probabilistic rule reduces
to the problem of dividing the amount k of a perfectly divisible homogeneous
commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences.
Hence, any Pareto efﬁcient probabilistic rule ϕ : VN → ˜ D(X) induces a
Pareto efﬁcient deterministic allocation rule Φ: ¯ RN →X(N,k) for the problem
of dividing the amount k of a perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among
a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. Furthermore, if the probabilistic
rule also satisﬁes strategy-proofness and no-envy, then the induced allocation rule
satisﬁes these properties as well. Any probabilistic rule with uniform marginal
distributions induces the uniform allocation rule and vice versa.7
Thedomain ¯ Rsatisﬁesthefollowing“richnesscondition”:givenxi,y i ∈ [0,k],
if ]xi,y i[∩K  = ∅, then for all zi ∈]xi,y i[∩K there exist preference relations
Ri, ¯ Ri ∈ ¯ R such that p(Ri)=p( ¯ Ri)=zi, xiPiyi, and yi ¯ Pixi. It can be checked
that for example for the proofs of Ching (1994) this condition sufﬁces to show
6 The somewhat tedious proof of the if-part of Lemma 4 is available from the authors upon request.





N p(Ri) ≥ k,
max(p(Rj),λ) if

N p(Ri) ≤ k,
where λ solves

N ˜ Ui(R)=k.268 L. Ehlers, B. Klaus
that if a deterministic rule Φ: ¯ RN →X(N,k) satisﬁes same-sidedness, strategy-
proofness, and equal treatment of equals, then it is the uniform rule restricted on
this domain.




peaked preferences. Since the marginal distributions of the uniform probabilistic
rules in Sect. 4 only depend on the peak proﬁle, we deﬁne these rules in the same
way in the current context for proﬁles of utility functions.
Corollary 1 (Kureishi, 2000). When each agent is a strictly risk averse vNM-
expectedutilitymaximizer,theuniformprobabilisticrulesaretheonlyprobabilistic
rulessatisfyingParetoefﬁciency,strategy-proofness,and equaltreatmentofequals.
Since equal treatment of equals is implied by either anonymity or no-envy, in
Corollary 1 we can replace equal treatment of equals either by anonymity (Sasaki,
1997) or by no-envy.
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